University of Wisconsin Milwaukee

UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations
May 2020

Cognitive Creatures and Conceptuality
William J. Gamrat
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Gamrat, William J., "Cognitive Creatures and Conceptuality" (2020). Theses and Dissertations. 2502.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/2502

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.

COGNITIVE CREATURES AND CONCEPTUALITY
by
Will Gamrat

A Thesis Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement for the Degree of

Master of Arts
in Philosophy

at
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
May 2020

ABSTRACT
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Under the Supervision of Professor Rachel Goodman, PhD
What does it take for thought to be conceptual? And which creatures get to count as having
conceptual thoughts? This paper explores these questions. The discussion follows Elisabeth Camp by
contrasting two families of views. One family of views endorses that conceptual thought is the
ability to represent the world in a way that brings about action. The other family wants more of
conceptual thought: namely, that it exhibit objectivity and, in particular, that it come with the ability to
speak a language. This discussion also follows Camp in looking for a better way to tie activeness to
conceptual thought than those that have, generally, dominated the philosophical literature. It departs
from Camp, however, by arguing that her account also fails to give a workable way of specifying this
connection. By drawing on the idea that conceptuality is tied to agency, it suggests a different way to
specify the connection. The suggestion is that flexibility—an open-ended use of cognitive abilities
that deals with environmental features in novel ways—provides a way to specify the connection
between activeness and conceptual thought.
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When considering what it is to have concepts, and so what sense to give to the word ‘concept’1,
there are two views which have played an important part in the thinking of cognitive scientists and
philosophers: minimalism and intellectualism. Minimalism is a permissive view allowing that any structured,
representational state is conceptual. But there are reasons to find this view lacking. You might think
that conceptual thought does more than represent2. It is at least intuitive that there are plenty of creatures
or systems that have representational states but aren’t conceptual thinkers. For example, ants seem to
have representational states but don’t seem to be conceptual thinkers. Intellectualism requires more of
conceptual thought, specifically that it do more than represent the world. It requires that thought must
be objective to count as conceptual. Intellectualism takes the ability to speak a language or appreciate
error (metarepresentation3) to be the mark of conceptual thought.
Elisabeth Camp4 argues for a sense of ‘concept’ meant to be a middle ground between
minimalism and intellectualism. She hopes to preserve what is good in both while inheriting the pitfalls
of neither. She claims conceptual thought does do more than just represent the world—contra
minimalism—but, denies that creatures need the ability to speak a language or have
metarepresentational abilities to be conceptual thinkers—contra intellectualism. She, instead,
supplements representing the world with conceptual thought being stimulus-independent, that is, active
enough so as not to be wholly determined by the environment. As Camp understands it, stimulus-

A note on formatting: I use single quotes to mention a word, double quotes to quote someone, capitals for concepts,
square brackets for thoughts, and italics for emphasis or to flag an important term.
2 There are a lot of things that could be entertained relative to my use of this word. I don’t get into them here. For a
discussion of some philosophical and methodological issues in the area, see, e.g.; Stich, Stephen., “What Is a Theory of
Mental Representation?”, Mind, Vol. 101.402, April 1992, pp. 243-61.
3 Metarepresentations are representations of representations, i.e. second-order representations. Metarepresentation, as an
ability of the sort the intellectualist is interested in is, roughly, an ability which allows for the check-ability of
representations against the world, i.e. to recognize the falsity or lack of warrant for beliefs by use of second-order
representations.
4 “Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus-Independence”, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, Vol. LXXVIII No. 2, (March 2009), pp. 275-311.
1
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independence expresses the requirement that, which thoughts a creature thinks are not triggered by
environmental stimuli.
There are two problems with Camp’s view. First, I argue that Camp’s sense of ‘concept’ fails
to distinguish itself from minimalism in the specific way she requires. Second, it relies on the
metaphysically suspicious idea that the activeness of thought is constituted by freedom from
triggering. Even so, I show that Camp has insights worth retaining. I conclude by providing an
alternative to Camp’s view which respects her insights and charts a middle ground between
minimalism and intellectualism. I privilege flexibility—an open-ended use of cognitive abilities that
deals with environmental features in novel ways.

Minimalism
As its name suggests, minimalism is a permissive view of conceptuality. The minimalist claims
that any structured, representational state is conceptual.
The story is roughly this. The function of a thought is to represent the world in a way that
leads to action5. So, having a thought is just being in a state which represents some feature of the
world and can bring about beneficial behavior. The minimalist has another requirement for conceptual
thought though—it must be structured6. Whole thoughts are composed of redeployable concepts. The
minimalist claims we can think of concepts as redeployable representational abilities, or
representations, which represent objects, properties, etc. These abilities, or representations, compose
a whole thought when that thought represents some state of affairs in which the objects, properties,
etc., represented by the abilities figure.

I mean ‘action’ in a relatively thin sense, as in, ‘behavior that is beneficial for the organism or system in question’.
The requirement that conceptual thought be structured is most often an appeal to the Generality Constraint as found
in Gareth, Evans., (ed. J. McDowell), Varieties of Reference, OUP: NY, 1982, p. 104.
5
6
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Camp summarizes this claim: distinctively conceptual thoughts must be “structured…at least
in the sense that the ability to think them results from the exercise of distinct, systematically interacting
representational abilities”7. Thus, if a creature has the concepts MAC, IS A DOG, and IS A CAT that
creature is able to form the thought [MAC, IS A DOG]8 and [MAC, IS A CAT]9. This creature may
not actually have either of these thoughts. It does, though, have the ability to have such thoughts.
The minimalist adds the requirement that conceptual thought be structured to support some
plausible observations. First, remember thoughts need to represent the world in a way that leads to
action. This requires that thoughts connect to one another in some rational way. For example, arguably
there must be some rational connection between the belief that there is ice cream in front of me and
the desire that I consume ice cream for those thoughts to lead to ice cream consumption. One way to
specify this connection, and the one favored by the minimalist, is by sameness of representational
ability across thoughts. That is, I use the same ice-cream concept in my belief and desire.
Second, consider a creature called ‘Mac’. When I drop a treat on the floor, Mac comes running.
But, presumably, Mac’s mind isn’t all that expansive. What explains Mac’s behavior is the added
requirement on conceptual thought. Finite though Mac’s mind is, he’s capable of thinking indefinitely
many thoughts. He’s capable of thinking those thoughts since his whole thoughts compose using
redeployable representational abilities. Mac doesn’t need a brand new and distinct ability each time he
does this treat-routine. He’s just reusing the same abilities to represent novel states of affairs. We can
make sense of the treat-routine by appeal to sameness of representational ability across Mac’s desires,
beliefs, and intentions.

Camp: 2009, 277-8
Here’s what I don’t mean. I don’t mean that representational abilities have the predicative structure that can be read off
from my above characterization of such concepts. Although, they may.
7
8
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It seems that minimalism explains how it is that representational states can lead to action,
given that they are appropriately structured. That is, whole thoughts are composed of the same
redeployable representational abilities. As a pay-off, we can make sense of how representational
abilities thus related aid and guide creatures in acting.
I will follow Camp in using “basic cognition”10 or ‘basic cognitive abilities’. These terms are
shorthand for something like: a group of abilities/states which fulfill the basic function of thought—
representing the world in a way that can lead to action. As discussed, the minimalist claims that thought
needs to be structured in order to play the role it does in generating actions. For the minimalist, basic
cognition just is conceptual thought. Camp says the same: “If this is right, though, then basic cognitive
abilities perform all the tasks we originally demanded of concepts”11.
We can note for now that basic cognition thus construed makes it unclear why we should not
think of conceptual creatures as automata—merely passively reacting to environmental conditions. If
all that is required for conceptuality is structured representation, then conceptual thinkers don’t need
to do anything more than differentially respond to their environment, provided their representational
states are structured. Call this the Problem of Passive Reactors. For example, though honey bees have a
“rich and interesting behavioral repertoire”, which behaviors they exhibit seems dependent on things
like the number of bees in the hive12. For a position to differ from minimalism, then, it must identify
something more for conceptual thought to do13. That is, something more than can be done with
representational states.

ibid. 280
ibid. 282
12 Alison R. Mercer, “The Predictable Plasticity of Honey Bees”, p. 64, in McEachern and Shaw, 2001, pp. 64-81.
13 However, for an insightful defense of minimalism, see: Peter Carruthers, “ANIMAL MINDS ARE REAL, AND
(DISTINCTIVELY) HUMAN MINDS ARE NOT”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 50.3, 2013, pp. 233-48.
10
11
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Intellectualism
Intellectualism requires more of conceptual thought. The intellectualist claims that conceptual
thought cannot be merely representational. It must also be objective—conceptual thinkers, claims the
intellectualist are cognizant of a world independent of their thoughts about it.
Conceptual thinkers need a complex mental life to support this. As before, conceptual thinkers
must be able to connect their thoughts in a way that can lead to action but must do so in a way that
respects the independence of the world. They must be able to check their thoughts against the world.
A requirement like this lends objectivity to conceptual thought.
Intellectualists cash this out by requiring abilities which conceptual thinkers must possess: the
ability to speak a language, or to represent one’s own thoughts (metarepresentation)14. Under the
heading of ‘intellectualist’ Camp cites a variety of thinkers: Davidson15, McDowell16, among others.
Though there are differences, they agree that the abilities required for conceptuality will distinguish
humans from other creatures.
Given this list of intellectualist-leaning thinkers it is no surprise that varied accounts of the
view have been given. A characterization of those views is something like what follows. Let’s imagine
Mac’s treat-routine again. I said before that it looked like Mac had some desires, beliefs, and intentions.
This is what the intellectualist denies. They deny this since, on their account, Mac is missing something
essential. Mac is missing the concept of BELIEF. As Davidson puts it, “…to be a rational animal is

What this amounts to and how best to understand the relationship between objectivity, language, and
metarepresentation has spawned a large literature from which objectors are not absent, see: Camp:2009, Hans-Johann
Glock, “Animals, Thoughts and Concepts”, Synthese, Vol. 123, 2000, pp. 35-64., and Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig,
Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality, OUP: Oxford, 2005, Ch. 22.
15 See, e.g.: Donald Davidson, “The Emergence of Thought”, Erkenntnis, Vol. 51 No. 1, (Animal Mind) 1999, pp. 7-17.
And Donald Davidson, “Rational Animals”, Dialectica, Vol. 36, 1982, pp. 317-28.
16 John McDowell, Mind and World, HUP, Cambridge, 1996.
14
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just to have propositional attitudes”17. But a creature can’t have a genuine propositional attitude
without the concept of PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE.
To have a belief is to be able to tell, among other things, the difference between a true one
and a false one. To do this, creatures need to be in a position to delineate between the two and the
ability to speak a language provides for such delineation. By having the expressive resources of a
language, thinkers better home in on the way the world is or could be. To be in a position to entertain
ways the world could be is to be not merely at the mercy of the world. They do this by communicating
their thoughts to one another making those thoughts subject to revision in answer to the way others
think the world is. Humans, for instance, can think about things which are not currently in their
environment. Humans also seem to have conceptual thoughts about things which have never been in
their environment. So, the intellectualist has identified more for conceptual thought to do then
minimalism has.
Intellectualism may seem to explain the division between the sort of thinking Mac does and the
sort of thinking you do. You are conceptual, Mac is not. But some linguistic creatures, e.g. toddlers,
do not seem to have a fleshed-out capacity for metarepresentation. Similarly, some creatures which
seem to exercise a metarepresentational ability, e.g. chimpanzees, are not linguistic. Furthermore, it is
not clear that giving linguistic creatures metarepresentational ability would qualify them for
conceptuality and vice versa. So, as it turns out, it’s unclear that the requirements of intellectualism
capture the difference between genuine thinkers and mere representors. Call this the Problem of Implausible
Requirements. To avoid it, we need something different than the requirements given by intellectualism18.

Davidson: 1982, 318.
There are other notable objections to intellectualism to the extent which it endorses holism. I’m not going to get into
them here but, see Fodor: 1998, esp. Appendix 5B, pp. 112-9. See also, Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore, Holism: A
Shopper’s Guide, Basil-Blackwell Ltd., Cambridge, 1992. (Esp. the preface of the latter.)
17
18
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Camp’s Project
For Camp, if these are the only two views on offer then one is faced with an unsatisfying
choice. But Camp charts a third, one that is somewhere between minimalism and intellectualism. I
now outline her view.
We should at least want conceptual thought to be active in the sense that it is not determined
by its environment. Conceptual thinkers are able to represent plenty of things that they aren’t presently
bumping into. For instance, I often think about Mac even though he lives in a different state. Camp
picks up on this: “genuine thought involves a clear distinction between representation and represented,
so that the former can occur in even the latter’s absence”19. Since minimalism does not satisfy this
requirement, it falls prey to the Problem of Passive Reactors. Intellectualism, or at least one prominent
variant, meets this requirement by requiring linguistic and metarepresentational ability. It, in turn, falls
prey to the Problem of Implausible Requirements.
On Camp’s assessment, what leads intellectualism to require linguistic ability is that this is
indicative of a creature’s representational abilities not being determined by its environment. This is
because conceptual thinkers should be able to form judgments about things which are not currently
presented to them and these are expressed, corrected, and justified in language. Conceptual thinkers
can represent features of the environment independent of the immediate occurrence of those features.
Intellectualism’s attributions of conceptuality are rooted in stimulus-independence (in one sense).
Stimulus-independence, in this sense, is had by creatures when they have the ability to represent a
feature of the world when that feature is not in their immediate environment. Call this stimulusindependence1.

19

ibid. 288
7

Camp thinks something like stimulus-independence1 is a good replacement for the abilities that
cause trouble for intellectualism20. It does, however, require some modifications. As it stands, mere
stimulus-independence1 won’t avoid the Problem of Passive Reactors. For even if a creature can
represent some particular feature in its absence, that has nothing to do with which feature it does
represent21. By way of illustration, we can consider Mac again. He represents treats when none are in
his immediate environment. But he never actually does represent treats unless he sees one of the humans
he lives with walking toward the kitchen—where the treats are kept. So, the environment still
determines how he exercises his representational abilities. Mac can think of treats when they’re not
around, it’s just that he only ever does when his family is approaching the treats-room. That is, it’s the
stimulus (the seeing someone walking toward the kitchen) that determines whether he represents the
treats. Now it looks like Mac’s a passive reactor. So, if there were another notion in the area that could
be attributed to creatures with basic cognition Camp should want it. It would give creatures more to
do with their thoughts, without saying anything about the abilities favored by intellectualism.
To avoid this difficulty Camp identifies the activeness of conceptual thought with its being
free from triggering by the environment. She calls this stimulus-independence2. Stimulus-independence2 is
something like: the capacity for systematic representational recombination to produce goal-oriented
action that is not triggered by the environment22. What Camp wants is a means by which conceptual
thinkers exhibit activeness and rationality in thought, in the sense that which thoughts they do in fact
think is not determined by their environment. According to Camp, stimulus-independence2 is what

ibid. 287
ibid. 291
22 Elsewhere (Camp, “A Language of Baboon Thought?”, 2009, 114, fn. 7 in Lurz, Robert W., The Philosophy of Animal
Minds, CUP, Cambridge, pp. 108-27 ), Camp defines stimulus-independence as “the ability to compile information from
multiple sources and occasions, and to apply it in flexible ways in various contexts”. I am more amenable to this way of
thinking about stimulus-independence2 and this may show that Camp anticipates some of my negative argument.
20
21
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shows the most promise for adding theoretical utility to her view. It accommodates the insights of its
competitors and, as we’ll see in the next section, should provide traction with behavioral evidence.

Detailing Camp’s View
Having outlined these views, I now distill that discussion. Camp takes seriously minimalism
and intellectualism. She uses the upshots of each view to inform her own. She also engineers her view
with the aim of avoiding the problems of each. Here are Camp’s three desiderata:
1. Avoid the pitfalls of minimalism (the Problem of Passive Reactors) and
intellectualism (the Problem of Implausible Requirements).
2. Keep the benefits of minimalism (Basic Cognition) and intellectualism (More to
do with Thoughts).
3. Provide better traction with respect to behavioral evidence than competing views.
The first two desiderata are made clear by previous sections. The third is a guiding principle
of sorts throughout but has not yet been discussed. To provide the most theoretically useful sense of
‘concept’, she claims that it must satisfy ‘3’ as well. Call the issue that satisfaction of ‘3’ avoids the
Problem of Unconstrained Attribution. That is, any attribution of conceptuality need be constrained by
behavioral evidence.
The Problem of Unconstrained Attribution illuminates a distinction. It is one thing to possess
an ability and another to exercise it. Observable behavior is taken to be exercise of possessed ability.
But, in the absence of behavior to evince ability possession, it is at least intuitive that we lose warrant
for attribution of ability. So, in order to behaviorally constrain attributions, mere possession won’t do.
Camp thinks minimalism runs itself into these cases since it identifies conceptuality with possession
of basic cognitive abilities.

9

To illustrate, we can consider a case of the type that Camp thinks is problematic for
minimalism. Honey bees communicate with one another via what is called “the waggle-dance”.23 This
routine is used to share information primarily about food sources. However, when the food source is
placed in a body of water—a place where there is usually not food, forager bees not trained to locate
the novel food source failed to respond to attempted communication. As discussed in Brockman, et.
al.: “This was not because the trained scout bees ceased to dance once the feeder was over the water;
they continued to dance with high vigor, and their waggles encoded a position over the water”24. Camp
points out that the minimalist is faced with a choice: either the bees have the thought that there is
nectar in the water and ignore it or the bees are incapable of thinking the thought that there is nectar
in the lake even when it is communicated to them. No matter how it turns out, since the bees do
nothing, minimalism fails ‘3’. That is, there is nothing about what the bees do—their behavior—which
helps adjudicate whether they are conceptual thinkers. In short, the behavior in scenarios like this does
not give us a way to tell if the creature is a conceptual thinker.
Stimulus-independence2, as Camp would have it, avoids the Problem of Unconstrained
Attribution. Activeness is identified with freedom from triggering. Notice that more instances of
recombinability will accompany greater stimulus-independence2 since freedom from triggering allows
creatures to actually recombine more. If a creature is stimulus-independent2, then it will exercise its
abilities in a way that evinces the ability to recombine its concepts. This is what the minimalist is
missing. Since Camp’s view requires exercise of ability and not just, in principle, possession it is

Andrew B. Barron and Jenny Aino Plath, “The evolution of honey bee dance communication: a mechanistic
perspective”, Journal of Experimental Biology, Vol. 220, 2017, pp. 4339-4346. For a classic treatment of these phenomena
see: Karl von Frisch, The Dance Language and Orientation of Bees, HUP, London, 1993.
24 Axel Brockman, Aung Si, Johannes Spaethe, Mandyam Srinivasan, Juergen Tautz, and Shaowu Zhang, “Honeybee
Odometry: Performance in Varying Natural Terrain”, PLOS Biology, Vol. 2.7, 2004, pp. e211.
23
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behaviorally constrained in a way that competitors are not. It thereby provides better traction with
respect to behavioral evidence, and so satisfies ‘3’.
It looks like Camp is in a good spot. She has made a unique contribution with her preferred
sense of ‘concept’ and has engineered it to grip behavioral evidence better than competitors. She has
made good on her promissory notes. However, in the next section, I argue that even given the full
resources of her view, it fails to deliver.

Minimalism and Metaphysical Suspicion
For Camp’s project to succeed, her view must meet her three desiderata. I now argue that
Camp fails ‘3’ and so does not meet her overall goal. That is, the view introduces a requirement which
cannot be satisfied by the view. More than that, I argue that the metaphysical implications of stimulusindependence2 are suspicious.
Camp puts weight on behavioral evidence for adjudicating between competing theories. For
Camp to satisfy ‘3’, she must have stimulus-independence2 give us a handle on behavioral evidence
that systematicity, by itself, does not. If stimulus-independence2 does not provide a better handle than
systematicity, we are free to ask whether Camp has actually provided a more theoretical useful sense
of ‘concept’. We should expect that stimulus-independence2 gives us some kind of explanatory power
that systematicity does not. Unfortunately for Camp, it does not; since it does not, Camp’s view ends
up being no better off than minimalism.
The present point is not so much that Camp is wrong for positing stimulus-independence2 as
it is that she is wrong for thinking that stimulus-independence2 is more behaviorally tractable than the
ability to recombine concepts. Since she places the evidentiary load on behavior, stimulusindependence2 does not provide a satisfactory answer to the Problem of Unconstrained Attribution.

11

What Camp wants from stimulus-independence2 is an empirical criterion for attribution of
conceptuality. But by identifying activeness with freedom from triggering she has set herself up such
that no behavior will evince active thought.
It is suspicious to think that behavioral evidence, as such, will provide evidence for freedom
from triggering, in the sense required by stimulus-independence2. If we observe some creatures doing
more than others, in the sense of exhibiting behavior which evinces more recombination, there is
nothing about that which shows they possess freedom from triggering. Although some creatures
exhibit a range of apparently undetermined behaviors, this may just point to a more complex causal
chain.
There is something about these behaviors, however, which suggests they recombine more and
to diagnose that ability the resources of minimalism do just fine. Since systematicity is interdependent
with stimulus-independence2 any exercise of ability which evinces one likewise evinces the other.
According to Camp, a greater degree of stimulus-independence2 underwrites a greater degree of
systematicity. But since any behavior that speaks to one also speaks to the other, there is nothing about
behavior as such that differentiates the resources of Camp’s view from the resources of minimalism. So,
each view ends up indeterminate with respect to the extension of ‘concept’ since neither is behaviorally
constrained in the way Camp wants. That is, Camp’s criticism of minimalism hinges on its failure to
provide a criterion by which we can adjudicate between conceptual thinkers and passive reactors in
certain cases. But her criterion fares no better since it is interdependent with the criterion of
minimalism. Stimulus-independence2 does not afford any additional resources in the way of an
empirical probe and so justification of its attribution rests on the same grounds as does the criterion
of minimalism.

12

There is a second worry for those who find a Camp-style view appealing. Stimulusindependence2 is metaphysically suspicious. Since it has been defined to involve freedom from
triggering, problems of how to understand this freedom from determination are not far off. It looks
like Camp’s view takes on board an objectionable conception of freedom. It is one thing to claim that
conceptual thinking is free from determination, in the sense of a one-one correspondence. It is
another, entirely, to claim that conceptual thinking is free from triggering. Minimalism, in this sense,
looks preferable by comparison. Its requirements are applicable, it gains as much traction with
behavior as Camp’s view, and it does this without taking on board metaphysical baggage.
In sum, Camp cannot complete her project by the lights of her project. But this is not the end
for Camp’s view. There are valuable insights contained in it. Her view and my critical stance toward it
also elucidate some issues of a more general sort. It is to those that I now turn.

A Response from Camp?
Having said what, I think is insightful and untenable about Camp’s view, I’d now like to
motivate a proposal. There are two considerations which serve to do this. The first is that cases of
instrumental reasoning are supposed to evince the presence of stimulus-independence2. I argue that
this means that, in the end, Camp appeals to stimulus-independence1, which she disavows, and not
stimulus-independence2. The second is that the Problem of Unconstrained Attribution returns for
cases of instrumental reasoning. I examine each in turn.
A brief word on the role of instrumental reasoning in Camp’s view is in order. Camp claims
that the “most minimal and plausible way for a creature to achieve greater stimulus-independence25 is
through instrumental reasoning”26. So, any instance of instrumental reasoning is supposed to evince

25
26

And here, she means what I have been calling “stimulus-independence2”.
(Camp: 2009, 292)
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stimulus-independence2. Camp settles on instrumental reasoning since it avoids the Problem of
Implausible Requirements while identifying more for thought to do than can be done with basic
cognitive abilities. For Camp, it is also important that instrumental reasoning occur through
“spontaneous ‘insight’”27. We can think of spontaneous insight as cognitive activity that makes use of
representational abilities such that those abilities are deployed, more or less, independently of features
of the world at a time. Camp seems to think this because she identifies activeness of thought with
freedom from triggering.
One way to cash out instrumental reasoning is in terms of its structure. This seems to be
Camp’s favored route. A creature occupies some actual state of affairs and desires to bring about a
goal state. In order to bring about the goal state the creature must represent some nonactual
intermediary state of affairs. The creature must represent a nonactual (i.e. absent) state of affairs in
order to bring that state about such that it can achieve its goal. Camp draws on various studies to
substantiate her claim that some nonhuman creatures do exhibit behaviors which evince a capacity for
instrumental reasoning. This is an odd move to make, since it seems like the structure of instrumental
reasoning would evince, if anything, stimulus-independence1since it seems to require only that
creatures represent in the absence of a feature. But Camp has claimed that this version of stimulusindependence isn’t the relevant one to conceptuality.
Second, you might think that this should not worry us since Camp requires spontaneous
insight, or that the intermediary state is sufficiently “disconnected”28 from the current state. On the
one hand, what is meant is clear. If we think of instrumental reasoning as a chain of inference29, we
can imagine the intermediary state as a sort of clever move. On the other hand, how can we tell the

ibid. 292
ibid. 296
29 Elisabeth Camp and Eli Shupe, “Instrumental reasoning in animals”, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal
Minds, eds. K. Andrews and J. Beck, Routledge, UK, 2017. pp. 100-108.
27
28
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difference, behaviorally, between a clever move which is untriggered, and one which is triggered, but
involves a more complex causal chain from environmental stimulus to representation?
Let’s consider Mac again. Mac wants a treat. There’s a treat on the counter. There’s a stool
near the counter, where there usually isn’t. Mac jumps on to the stool and then on to the counter. He
gets the treat and jumps down. But it was just as much the features that triggered their representation,
it would seem, as it was Mac who figured out how to make use of them. Stimulus-independence2
comes in degrees, but which intermediary states that are represented would still seem to be triggered
by the initial environmental conditions. Now, the Problem of Unconstrained Attribution returns since
it’s not clear, from the behavior, if it is spontaneous.

Gradable Agency
Even though I have argued against Camp, there is no sense in throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. There is something in Camp’s view worth saving—the connection between conceptuality
and agency. I claim that this is the insight of Camp’s view. Further, her view makes conceptuality an
explicitly gradable affair30. By being gradable, such a view can accommodate a variety of nonlinguistic
creatures as conceptual thinkers to some extent. Both the connection with agency and inclusiveness, though
not gradeability, are benefits I will preserve.
Camp’s connection between conceptual thought and stimulus-independence2 suggest a
connection between conceptuality and freedom. I’ve so far argued that the sort of freedom Camp
appeals to is problematic. But, her view does point to a more apt connection between conceptuality
and agency. Her insight is that what we look for when we look for conceptuality are behaviors that
suggest agency.

30

See, ibid. 305
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Camp’s willingness to make conceptuality inclusive is also a point in her favor. Observations of
animal behavior increasingly make it harder to say that anything without a language is not conceptual,
full-stop. Thinking about conceptuality in a way that is inclusive promises to capture more data about
non-human animals and what they do with their concepts, given that one can be inclined to think
some of them do have some. So, this too ought to be saved and applied to further research. If
attributions of conceptuality and agency are tied, as I have suggested, and conceptuality a gradable
affair, then agency follows suit. Where I arrive, unlike Camp, is not a gradable view in the same sense,
but it is one which preserves the conceptuality-to-agency connection and is inclusive.
What we should be looking for is a philosophically robust, though not so metaphysically
suspicious, sense of agency which retains inclusivity as a feature. This is the real upshot of Camp’s
discussion. How to engineer such a sense of agency and what could act as evidence for it is suggested
by the next section.

Flexibility Privileged
To recap, Camp identifies the activeness of thought with freedom from triggering. I have
argued that this does not end well. This identification prompts the engineering of stimulusindependence2 and the privileging of instrumental reasoning. Both create problems which cannot be
solved without significantly reworking some baseline desiderata for a theory of concepts. So, to
preserve what is worthwhile in Camp’s project something else must be offered. This is a rough outline
of a viable way to preserve inclusivity and the conceptuality-to-agency connection.
First, my claim is that we should take concepts to be tied to agency. I also claim that the
behaviors which we take to be evidence for concept use are behaviors which are suggestive of agency.
This is the sense in which conceptual thinkers are not automata. But, this sense of agency, and so
conceptual thinking, need not require freedom from triggering. So, the activeness of conceptual
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thought must be identified with something other than stimulus-independence. This identification
provides for a philosophically robust though not so metaphysically suspicious sense of agency and so
conceptuality.
I identify the activeness of thought with an open-ended use of basic cognitive abilities which,
relative to the representational repertoire in question31, deals with environmental features in novel
ways. Call this flexibility. Creatures with flexibility exercise the same cognitive abilities on different
occasions to deal with novel features of the world and the same features of the world can result in
exercise of differing cognitive abilities on different occasions. Remember, flexibility ought to be
behaviorally constrained. It is, since behavior can permit us to infer the presence of cognitive abilities
in the first place.
What we’re tracking when we’re attributing conceptuality has more to do with the various ends
a creature is capable of pursuing, not just its means. Here, the conceptuality-to-agency connection
becomes prominent. By way of illustration, consider what humans do when navigating their world.
We are all limited by time, resources, our representational repertoire at a time, and have many things
we would like to get done. I have a meeting for most of the afternoon, so I have to be in my office,
but I have class most of the evening, so I’ll have to go to that. But I also would like to get lunch, and
I’ll probably want some coffee. Let’s say these are all ends. I behave flexibly to achieve my various
ends. I eat lunch in the office, I buy a coffee pot, I call a friend to bring filters of which we’re out, etc.
Exercising flexibility allows me to pursue more ends at a time, since I have multiple ways to achieve
those ends. To contrast, we can imagine me again, but without flexibility. Now, for instance, any time
For the difference between this, broadly, holistic point and the sort of holism advocated by proponents of
intellectualism see: David Finkelstein, “Holism and Animal Minds”, in Crary, 2007, pp. 251-278. Finkelstein is, there,
interested in distinguishing the sort of holism Wittgenstein endorses from the sort of holism Sellars/Rorty endorse. As I
read the distinction, it has much to do with what is discussed regarding the idea of a middle ground between minimalism
and intellectualism. Though, Finkelstein does not use those words.
31
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I want coffee I go to the café but when the café is closed, I’m out of luck. Also, if I don’t have time
to go to the café because I have other things to do, I won’t be able to achieve one of my ends: getting
coffee. I seem incapable of pursuing a broad spectrum of ends due to my lack of facility with means,
I only have one way to get coffee and when that way is frustrated somehow, I don’t get coffee. We
can also consider foraging behavior in ants which want to get to their nest but only have one way of
doing so—path-integration32.
You might think I make room for conceptually impoverished creatures to be conceptual
thinkers. You’re right. A creature who has relatively few representational abilities but can use them
flexibly, will count as conceptual by my lights. But notice that in defining flexibility I did so relative to
a representational repertoire. Flexibility, though inclusive, asks us to consider creatures in light of the
use they make of attributable representational ability. So, creatures might not have a large range of
representational abilities but may still count as conceptual since what they and the way they do, relative
to those abilities, evinces flexibility. Although chimpanzees are not human, their use of cognitive
abilities relative to their representational repertoire is flexible and so conceptual. Ants, however, are
too rigid to count. I don’t pretend to be capable of adjudicating prior to some observation between
which creatures are conceptual and which are not, but flexibility promises to provide a guide. This is,
I take it, what we were after in engineering the most theoretically useful sense of ‘concept’.

Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that our attributions of conceptuality ought to behaviorally
constrained. I have presented a view which differs from minimalism in that it requires thinkers to

32See,

e.g.: Müller, M. and Wehner, R., “The hidden spiral system: systematic search and path integration in desert ants,
Cataglyphis fortis”, Journal of Comparative Physiology, Vol. 175.5, Nov. 1994, pp. 525-30. And Räber, F. and Wehner, R.,
“Visual spatial memory in desert ants, Cataglyphis bicolor (Hymenoptera: Formicidae)”, Experientia, Vol. 35.12, Dec. 1979,
pp. 1569-71.
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make use of their thoughts in a way that minimalism does not. Namely, by an explicit requirement
that conceptual thinkers make variable use of their cognitive abilities on the model of flexibility. So,
its theoretical resources serve to sort phenomena differently than minimalism. It differs from
intellectualism in that the requirements on conceptuality are different—less restrictive. They are,
though, not implausible especially given the role concepts typically play in theories and empirical
support from the behavioral sciences. Finally, it differs from Camp’s view in locating a different
diagnostic tool which does not run into problems of behavioral constraint, at least not
straightforwardly, since flexibility is relative to a representational repertoire. In tying agency to
conceptuality it also suggests—contra Camp—that where minimalism goes wrong may not be in
falling prey to the Problem of Passive Reactors but rather in making too many creatures agents given
its requirements.
Along the way, various competing views on the matter were entertained. The insights from
these were picked up in order to present a rough outline of a view which provides for a potentially
novel program—one that both acknowledges the complexity of human agents but attempts to situate
them amongst agents not wholly unlike themselves. I leave it open what consequences such a view
might have.
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